On modern safeguard in the field of peaceful application of nuclear energy by Gmelin, W. et al.
Mai 1968
Institut für Ang ewandte Reaktorphysik
KFK 800
On Modern Safeguard in the Field of Peaceful Application of
Nuclear Energy
1. Basic Considerations
11. Preparational Considerations for a System Analysis





Institut für Angewandte Reaktorphysik
ON MODERN SAFEGUARD





PREPARATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SYSTEM ANALYSIS
by
W. Gmelin, D. Gupta and W. Ifafele
Gesellschaft für Kernforschung m.b.H., Karlsruhe




Institut für Angewandte Reaktorphysik
ON MODERN SAFEGUARD





W. Gmelin, D. Gupta and W. ffafele
Gesellschaft für Kernforschung m.b.H., Karlsruhe
1. It is useful to recall that one can distinguish between three fairly
different phases of the development of the use of nuclear energy for power
production. The first phase lasted from 1943 to 1955 and was by and large
a military oriented phase. The Hanford and Windscale production plants
had been buHt during this period. During that time keeping track of the
power production was synonymous with keeping track of the availability of
Plutonium. The second phase started obviously with President Eisenhower's
programme, "Atoms for Peace", and the first Geneva Conference of 1955 can
be considered as the milestone for that. Then it was research and develop-
ment with a strong international exchange of information which characterized
the style of the second phase. But by the same t6ken, the reactor develop-
ment was kind of a marginal scientific venture with no real commercial feed
back. This changed immediately after the Oyster Creek event, that is in
1964, and this was the beginning of tPe third phase of reactor development.
With some delay other countries have had their Oyster Creek event during
these years too. The third phase is the phase of large scale industrial and
commercial use of nuclear energy, including full scale industrial competition.
It is also during this third phase that the commercial use of all steps of
the fuel cycle, that is reprocessing, refabricating and possibly isotope
separation, takes place, because a larger population of operating civilian
power reactors requires it. And therefore, it is at the beginning of this
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third phase that a properly designed safeguard system has to materialize.
The design criteria for such a safeguard system must be oriented toward
this third reactor phase in spite of the fact that already the second
phase required some safeguard measures.
2. It is vital not to proliferate the use of nuclear energy into the
military domain. If a nuclear weapons fabrication plant as such would
easily be detectable, the safeguard system would then undoubtedly be
directed towards the existence of such a plant, and in this case there
would be no feed back to the peaceful use of nuclear energy whatsoever.
Now it appears to be virtually impossible to detect nuclear weapons
factories as such. Therefore, not a direct, but an indirect scheme of
safeguard has to be employed.
3. This indirect scheme of safeguard concentrates on the supply of fission-
able material, which would be necessary if the use of nuclear energy
proliferates into the military domain. If one can ensure that all fissionable
material does remain in the civil domain. such proliferation cannot take place.
Therefore, it is the only and specific objective of a modern and properly
designed safeguard system that all fissionable material, which i5 being used
in the civil domain. remains there. But it is, logically, not the obJective
of a modern and properly designed safeguard system to control the peaceful
application of nuclear energy as such. This creates undoubtedly a feed back
from military concems to the peacefül application of nuclear energy.
4. If the flow of fissionable material in the civil domain could be entirely
and effectively contained in the civil domain, this would be the only
necessary step. In this case it is irrelevant to know the amount and the
quality of the fissionable material. Therefore,it must be the first safeguard
measure of a modern safeguard system to make sure that such containment
principle materializes where ever this is possible. A reactor building is by
its very nature already a containment. The first safeguard measure would
mean that one has to make sure that fuel elements for example enter the
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reactor building only through one door and leave only through one door and
that the building is tight for fuel elements otherwise. This may imply
eventually, also more rigid gate controls for personnel and equipment in
general.
Irradiated and unirradiated fuel elements (and fuel) require transportation.
The first safeguard measure requires the extrapolation of the containment
principle to transportation. This leads to the problem of safing and
sealing. The reprocessing plant then has,again a containment, again the gate
controls must complete the containment requirements. Special interest must
be given to the control of waste stream. The refabrication plant has basically
similar features.
Therefore we conclude, that there is room for materializing the containment
idea, that is, the first safeguard measure. The tightness ofthe physical
containments and the fact that there is only one entrance and one exit for
fuel can be verified once in the early stages of the construction of the
principal nuclear facility in question. The tightness of the containment
may be even more obvious, if there are certain established and mandatory
ground rules for the general layout and possibly the construction of the
building of a principal nuclear facility. If the containment of the domain
of civil application of nuclear energy would be 100 % tight, that is
effective, no other safeguard measures would be necessary.
5. Concern has been expressed that the domain of civil application of nuclear
energy remains a civil domain, inside it's tight containment. In other words,
one can think of a situation, where in a principle nuclear facility a clandestine
and military oriented loop hole for fissionable material can be installed. By
pressing logics to it's extreme, one can argue that even in that case the
clandestine military oriented product has finally to leave the containment and
will be detected then, but admittedly this argument might not have too much
practical importance. The more practical argument is that each principal nuclear
facility has to be not too large and as specific as possible, for example it
does not seem reasonable to make a whole nuclear complex, e.g. a whole national
laboratory, a principle nuclear facility inside a tight containment. Some
concern remains if the first safeguard measure remains the only one.
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Similarly, reprocessing and even more so refabrication facilities handle
fissionable material in the form of aqueous solutions or powders; there is
a direct and continuous contact with the fissionable material~ Therefore,
there is a small but possibly finite ~ossibility of diversion even if the
first measure of safeguard (the containment) is rather thoroughly implemented.
This is so, because the complete containment in the context of safeguards
includes for example also gate controls, and these may be to some minor extent
incomplete. In the case of reprocessing and refabrication facilities this
is somewhat in contrast to the situation in the case of heterogeneous
reactors, and this means virtually all existing reactors. In the case of these
heterogeneous reactors the possibility of diversion is significantly
smalle~ as the fissionable material is contained there in a discrete and
finite number of fuel subassemblies, and it is very difficult (if not
impossible) to divert a whole fuel assembly if there is gate control.
A small but possibly finite possibility of diversion may exist for the
case of transportation too.
So it seems necessary to introduce besides of the first safeguard measure
a second safeguard measure. This second safeguard measure is to safeguard
the flow of fissionable materials throughout the whole fuel cycle. The
relevant flow of fissionable material is comprised of bomb grade material
only, that is plutonium and highly enriched uranium. If besides of such
fissionable material, also low enriched uranium and source material is
subject to the second safeguard measure, a feature of redundancy enters
the picture.
6. This second measure, namely to safeguard the flow of fissionable material,
can best be executed at'certain strategie points. The first safeguard
measure, that is the containment measure, provides for a kind of conservation
of mass flow and it i5 therefore not necessary to follow the flow of fission-
able material everywhere. An extended statistical analysis seems to be
necessary to identify all of these strategie points and their relative
importance. But if one follows the flow of fissionable material through
the closed fuel cycle (reactor, reprocessing plant, refabrication plant
and, if necessary, also the waste stream and the isotope separation plant),
it is very likely that all entrances and exits of principal nuclear facilities
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are among such strategie points; additional strategie points inside and
outside of the prineipal nuelear faeilities may be neeessary for assuring
fully effeetive safeguards.
Perhaps one of the most important strategie points at all may be the ehemieal
dissolver at the entranee of the reproeessing plant ~1-7, ~2-7. In realizing
this it becomes also apparent that it is no longer necessary to keep track of
the power produetion seheme of a partieular fuel element in a reaetor in
order to judge on the amount of produeed plutonium. This is of partieular
importance, beeause to judge on the amount of the produced plutonium by keeping
track of the reator power production is a cumbersome thing. If aecuracies
of 1 - 2 % are required, and this is eertainly the case, it is not suffieient
to know about the integral power production. In that ease in addition to
integral power measurement, the measurement of the power distribution, the
management of fuel loading and eontrol rod operation, the measurement of
the spectrum and other information is neeessary thus leading to the request,
that virtually the last design and operational detail of a reactor, probably
without the desired satisfactory ultimate safeguard results, shall be
available. One should also bear in mind that power stretching of a given
power reactor will be an affair of high eommereial significane~ and the
scheme of power stretching has to be known, if the plutonium produetion
shall be ealeulatetl from the power production. This is a dead end road.
All what is necessary instead, fortunately, is to make sure that the
irradiated fuel element reaches the dissolver of a reprocessing plant.
This has been explained by other authors too L-3_7, ~4-7.
If the flow of fissionable material can be safeguarded at these strategie
points, it is unneeessary for an inspector to go everywhere at any time.
In that ease the inner part of operating prineipal nuclear faeilities
remains untouched.
7. It is also undesireable that an inspeetor goes everywhere at any time
and it is in turn very desireable indeed that the inner part of operating
prineiple nuclear facilities remainuntouched. This is particularly true
for reproeessing and refabrication plants. It is namely the cheap fuel
cyele whieh outweighs the higher capital costs of nuelear power plants
as eompared with eonventional power plants and thus ultimately makes
nuclear power superior to fossile power. This is demonstrated in table 1
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where the contribution of the capital costs and fuel costs to the total
energy generation costs are given for a typical coal fired power plant,
a light water nuclear power station and a fast breeder power station (of
the late 70's).
Table 1
Typical energy generation costs from different power plants (of the late 70's)
in mills/kwh
coal fired plant um nuclear power fast breeder power
station station
capital costs 2,1 2,55 3,0
fuel costs 4,1 1,75 1,0
total costs 6,2 4,30 4,0
In order to have such a cheap fuel cycle, a cheap and effective reprocessing
and refabrication with low specific costs must be obtained. This is particu-
larly true for the forthcoming generation of fast breeder power stations,
because these power stations are expected to have the highest capital costs.
Fast breeder power stations will operate on the basis of the plutonium/
uranium fuel cycle and the fuel elements will use plutonium/uranium fuel l
beginning with the mixed oxides. Todays fuel fabrication technology is not
yet sufficiently developed for meeting the required low specific production
costs of something like 100 $/kg-fuel, industrial development still has to
go some way. It is very likely that particularly the fuel fabrication
technology will be an ever expanding and sophisticated one ~5-7, ~6-7, and
that cheap specific fabrication costs will be an integral part for an over
all competitivity, especially for fast breeder reactors.
Consider for example the fuel cycle costs of a typical Na-cooled 1000 MWe
fast breeder reactor of the late 70's as they are foreseen today. The total










Let us further consider an increase of 0.1 kwh for Ktotal' For the
30 years life-time of the 1000 MWe power station with a load faetor of
0.8 this gives an over all inerease of 21 mio. $, the present worth of this
inerease at the beginning of the plants life-time at 7 % interest rate, is
8.6 mio. $. This must be measured against the total capital costs for the
new plant, which is something like 100 mio. $ (direct eosts). One should
further realize that the differenee between eompeting bids usually cannot
be larger than, say, 5 0/0, that is in our example 5 mio. $. Therefore,
0.1 mills difference in the fuel cycle may already be deeisive for getting
a reactor order in a eompetitive environment. One also must realize that
mills .a difference in power production costs of 0.2 - 0.3 kwh lS usually eon-
sidered to be a large enough incentive to develop a new reaetor line, be-
cause a fraction of the savings in terms of present worth may make up for
the development costs already. Also in this context therefore 0.1 ~~lS
is not a small quantity.
A . f 0 1 mills. K 'f f 1 th 'f'n 1ncrease 0 • kwh 1n total now appears, 1, or examp e, e spec1 1C
costs for fabrication increase from 100 $/kg to 130 $/kg. Whatever the
assessment of importance to a difference of this order of magnitude might be,
it is highly likely that the eommercial fuel manufacturer and also the
commercial reprocessor have to use the last trick in order to be competitive.
Among other things also the possible hampering by highly redundant and
therefore, not really necessary safeguarding of inspectors inside an operating
fabrication plant must be avoided. A safeguard procedure which concentrates
at certain strategie points will suit this situation best.
We also have to mention the problem of industrial proprietary information.
It is true that going into a reactor does not reveal proprietary information
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too quiekly, but this may be different already in ease of a reproeessing
plant and even more so in ease of a fabrieation plant. Sometimes the argument
is put forward that the teehnology of todays TBP's reproeessing plants is
prineipally known. But even in this ease the operation details, like for
example the reduetion of the valenees of Pu, are of eomrnereial signifieanee
and further, at some date there might be a teehnologieal breakthrough, whieh
ehanges the whole situation drastieally. As mentioned before, the question
of industrial proprietary information is more explieit in the Pu fuel
fabrieation plants of the next five years, and the problem beeomes most
obvious if one eonsiders the ease of an isotope separation plant. Also
separation plants belong to the eomplex of the nuelear fuel eyele and here
the applieation of highly eonfidential and possibly new teehnologies is
most likely. Separation plants have to be subJeet to safeguard as it is the
ease with all the other prineipal nuelear faeilities. Again effeetive safe-
guard and the integrity of industrial proprietary information ean best be
eombined, if safeguard eoneentrates at the properly defined strategie
points only.
8. The seeond safeguard measure, namely to measure the flow of fissionable
material at certain strategie points, is effeetive in counterbalancing the
possibly incomplete materialization of the containment principle, that is
the first safeguard measure, as long as there is the flow of fissionable
material, that is a throughput. But all principal nuelear facilities have
an inventory, a hold up, which does not participate (per saldo) in the
flow of fissionable material. With respeet to a hold up of a principal
nuclear facility only the first safeguard measure (containment) is efficient.
The ratio of hold up to the integrated throughput in a given time period
is charaeteristic for the degree with which the incompleteness of the first
safeguard measure eannot be counterbalaneed by the second safeguard measure.
This ratio has to be as small as possible and therefore, this requirement
determines at least qualitatively the distance between the strategie points.
The smaller that distance is, the smaller is that above mentioned ratio
and the more effective is the second safeguard measure. A decreasing hold up
between strategie points usually is accompanied by inereasing constancy of
that hold up, and such eonstaney of the hold up is another desirable feature.
A constant hold up namely allows to make firm conelusions about possible
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diversions by only measuring the flow of fissionable material past the
adjacent strategie points. This will be more explicitly explained in a
later chapter.
It is important to realize that the distance between two strategie points
with its associated hold up i5 the free parameter which allows for the
adjustment of the efficiency of the safeguard system in question to a
required and quantified leveL In designing such particular saf'eguard
system it should be the intention however to start with the entranees
and exits of the involved principal nuclear facilities as the only
strategie points and to inerease the number of additional strategie points
only to the extent whieh is neeessary for meeting the required and quanti-
fied level of systems effieieney.
For tha~ the required level of systems effieieney has indeed to be quanti-
fied. A criterion of the following type must be given by the safeguard
authorities:
"The requirements of safeguard are met if with x % eonfidence level
the material balance is closed within y 0/0."
For the sole pur~ose of illustrating this statement it shall be mentioned
that x % may be something like 95 % and y % may be something like 2 0/0.
The exaet figures have to come from a partieular and detailed system
analysis and they may be reviewed from time to time in the light of
technological improyem~~~~ng;~RPerationalexperienee. Such quantif'ieation
is also necessary for the unavoidable and forthcoming cost benefit analysis
of such safeguard systems. Remarkably enough, none of the existing safeguard
systems has established such a quantified criterion. And all the existing
safeguard systems are open ended therefore and that is the ultimate point
of concern. Establishing the above mentioned quantified safeguard criterion
means that this open endedness is cut and safeguard becomes a rational
venture. The later chapters of this paper will deal with the mathematical
aspect of all this in greater detail.
In paragraph 5 the eoncernabout elandestine loop holes inside a principal
nuclear faeility has been mention~d. Here too the freely adjustable distance
between strategical points helps to make these loop holes such a remote
possibility that the quantified criterion is met.
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More generally, one ean always think of meehanisms whieh are extremely
remote and which exist more or less only by logieal argument but have no
praetieal signifieanee. And here it is useful to reeall that the objeetive
of safeguards is not to make diversion impossible rather than to make it
more improbable. Meaningful safeguard has limited objeetives with limited
efforts.
In paragraph 4 it has been mentioned that it i6 desirable tohave eertain
established and mandatory ground rules for the general layout and possibly
the eonstruetion of the bui+ding of a prineipal nuclear faeility in order
to make the containment funetion of the building obvious. The same is true
for making the strategie pointseffeetive and obvious. The dissolver of
a chemical reproeessing plant for example can loeally be somewhat separated
from the main plant and would be accessible therefore for safeguard inspectors.
Or the internal storage area of a fuel fabrication plant may, by proper
design of the building, be separated from the manufaetoring area and in-
between there would be a strategie point, where the day by day amounts of
fissionable material have to pass by. One has to realize that the majority
of chemical reprocessing and fuel fabrieation plants are still to come and
therefore there is room and time for establishing these ground rules. To a
lesser extent this i5 also true for power reactors, but the whole safeguard
problem is much easier there anyway (at least for heterogeneous reactors
as mentioned above). Only so far as these ground rules for the general layout
of the building are eoneerned, that the search for design details is relevant.
In advanee of the construetion of the building of a principal nuelear faeility
the compliance with these ground rules shall be verified. According to the
content of the three safeguard measures there is no reason to require other
design details than those mentioned above.
9. Measuringthe flow of fissionable material at the strategie points can
only be done with a eertain aeeuraey. Integrating the flow over a eertain
time intervall leads to eertain absolute inaeeuraeies whieh beyond a eertain
threshold cannot be aeeepted. Therefore kind of readjusting the scale is
necessary from time to time and this ean be done by inventory taking. This
mayaIso be necessary if unforeseenevents happen, for example a sufficiently
large discrepaney in the material balance which cannot be explained.
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Therefore a third safeguard measure has to be established, namely the
inventory taking.
Inventory taking should be considered only as the third line of defense
and it should be the intention to have that as rarely as possible. The
assessment of accuracies of measuring the flow of fissionable material,
of the distance between strategie points and of other safety system para-
mete~s shall be such that such inventory taking possibly coincides with
the routine wash outs of the principal nuclear facilities. A reprocessing
plant for example envisages such wash outs about twice every year anyway.
Inventory taking in itself has certain inaccuracies and can be done by
different methods. One method is the wash out. By that the inventory is
temporarily transformed into a flow, the inventory leaves the plant past
the strategie point at the exit. Therefore it is again not necessary for
the inspector to touch the inner parts of the plant. If however the operator
of the plant prefers an in plant inventory taking this might be done then.
In any event, the mode of inventory taking should be at the discretion of
the operator, provided that the envisaged mode of inventory taking meets
the aetual requirements for aceuracy.
10. The~hree safeguard measures have now been deseribed. The leading idea
is to eoncentrate safeguard action at the strategie points to make it
more efficient and less intrusive. Therefore the identifieation of these
strategie points and the evaluation of their efficiency is the first task
of the designer of a safeguard system. It should be possible to accomplish
that task within a year or two.
If safeguard concentrates at these strategie points of the flow of fission-
able material, one naturally looks for the possible use of instruments to
measure this flow. This may be also of special importanee if one looks for
the rapid expansion of the produetion of nuclear energy. Germany alone
expeets 20 - 30 000 MWe or so by 1980, the corresponding figures for the
common market are 50 - 75 000 MWe, for the whole world 200 000 MWe or more L-9-7.
To safeguard sueh a population of reactors and associated fuel cyele facilities
in all likelihood instruments are needed in order to keep up withthis
dynamic expansion. The development of these instruments is the second task.
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Contrary to the first task this may require more time, maybe something
like four or five years. After a sueeessful development of a tamper proof
version of these instruments safeguard inspectors shall gradually be
replaced by these instruments to the largest possible extent. A proper
automatie data processing system is expected to handle and evaluate all
these instrument readings.
But it should be reealled that this instrumentation and automatie data
processing is only the seeond stage of establishing a modern safeguard
system, the first stage, whieh ean be implemented mueh more readily, is
the identification and installation of the strategie points.
11. After these considerations one arrives at the following scheme for
a modern safeguard system:
a) The objeetive of a modern safeguard system is to reduce significantly
the possibility of diversion of fissionable material from the domain of
peaceful use of nuelear energy.
b) It is the fissionable material in the domain of peaceful use of nuclear
energy and not the peaceful use of atomic energy as such that must be
subject to safeguard, which is in view of the ultimate purpose of such
safeguard, namely to prevent the illegal manufaeturing of nuclear
weapons, an indirect approach.
c) The design of a modern safeguard system is governed by a quantified
criterion of the following type:
"The requirements of safeguards are met, if withx % confidence level
the material balance i5 elosed within y 0/0."
By such a quantified criterion, to be spelled out by the safeguard
authorities, the up to now existing open endedness of safeguard is
closed and safeguard becomes a rational venture.
d) The first safeguard measure is to materialize the principle of containing
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the fissionable material to the greatest possible extent. Therefore
this first safeguard measure covers among otherthings: real contain-
ments (buildings) of prineipal nuelear faeilities, gate eontrols, waste
control, safing and sealing, in partieular in the ease of transportation.
e) The second safeguard measure is to measure the flow of fissionable
material at a finite number of strategie points. The assessment of
strategie points, their distanee and therefore the hold up between
two of these strategie points and their required aecuraey of flow
measurement shall be such, that the quantified eriterion e) is met.
In partieular it will be the amount and the eonstaney of the hold up
between two strategie points whieh has to be taken into aceount when
this assessment is made.
f) The third safeguard measure is inventory taking, intentionally a rare
event for readjusting the scale of flow measurement, which should
eoineide to the largest possible extent with the anyway expected
regular wash outs. The type of inventory taking shall be at the dis-
cretion of the operator of a prineipal nuclear facility, provided that
the aceuracy of the choosen type of inventory taking is in conformity
with the purpose of that inventory taking.
g) Inspectors shall not be allowed to interfere with the operation of a
principal nuclear facility and shall have aeeess only to the strategie
points.
If in the course of safeguard experience it ean be demonstrated that
also another area of a principal nuclear facility has to be touched,
this other area shall beidentified as another strategie point by
proper agreements between the involved parties or authorities.
h) Design details of a prineipal nuelear faeility are of relevanee for
safeguard purposes only insofar, as eertain ground rules for the
general layout of the building must be implemented. These ground rules
are there to make the containment funetion of the building obvious




i) On a somewhat larger time seale tamper proof instruments for measuring
the flow of fissionable material at the strategie points shall be
developed and their readings shall be proeessed by an suitable automatie
data proeessing system. As these instruments eome up, they shall
gradually replaee the safeguard inspeetors.
This eoneludes the basic eonsiderations, that is part I of this paper.
Part 11 will deal now with more speeific aspects of the mathematical
analysis of the safeguard problem.
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IN TrlE FIELD OF PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY
Part II
PREPARATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR A SYSTEM ANALYSIS
by
w. Gmelin, D. Gupta and W. Häfele
Gesellschaft für Kernforschung m.b.H., Karlsruhe
1. The unit cell- of modern safeguard
Part 11 of this paper shall outline a number of mathematical considerations
which prepare for a more rigid and complete systems analysis. In so doing the
considerations will concentrate on a single principal nuclear facility the
character of which does not have to be specified in detail, but one may
think of a fuel fabrication plant. This principal nuclear facility shall
have one entrance and one exit only and these two points shall be the
strategie points. A fuel fabrication plant has also exits for wastes but
in the context of this more abstract consideration we can include these
side exits in the above mentioned one exit.
The principal nuclear facility (from here on we will refer to it simply
as facility) shall have an inventory, that is a hold up. Throughout our
considerations we will be driving towards situations where the hold up
can be made as constant as possible because that allows for quick and
fairly clean safeguard conclusions. In part I of our paper we have outlined
the approach where a facility may be subdivided into a number of units between
additional strategie points in order to decrease the hold up and to increase
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the constancy of the hold up of such unitsDJ • In the course of the following
considerations however we will not make th~ assumption,that the hold up
is necessarily constant. The goal of these now following considerations is
to arrive at a number of general terms which make future discussions on
safeguard easier and may help to prepare a system analysis. In short: We
are considering the unit cell of a modern safeguard system:





In Fig. 1, m. denotes the rate of input, m t the rate of output.l.n ou
2. The invoking of the third safeguard measure.
The second safeguard measure of measuring m. and m t envisages thel.n ou
difficulty, that these measurements have a certain inaccuracy. These
inaccuracies sum up and after a certain time they will lead to a certain
total uncertainty of indicating the hold up. We now assume that an inventory
taking has to take-place when the integrated inaccuracies have passed a
certain threshold, that means, the third safeguard measure shall be invoked
then.
As a matter of fact, there are possibilities for other criteria to invoke
the third safeguard measure. For example: The inventory as calculated from
input and output has passed a certain level, or the averaged time derivative
of the hold up as calculated from input and output has passed a certain level,
or a combination of both. Or one can think of certain tracer techniques which
lead to the establishment of a criterion to invoke the third safeguard measure.
Or further, considerations for the incompleteness of the first safeguard measure
may lead to the invoking of the third safeguard measure.
Here we will assume however, that the third safeguard measure takes place
when the integrated inaccuracies of the flow measurements have passed a certain
level.
We further assume here that the operator"is aware of the results and
characteristics of the inspectors measurements. This is not necessarily the
case, the opposite may happen, but with the considerations of this paper we
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are driving towards the definition of rather general terms and therefore
this assumption will not have too strong consequences here. A more specific
system analysis however,may arrive at quite different detailed conclusions
indeed, if the assumption is made that the operator is not aware of the
inspector's measurements.
3. The three statements of statistical nature.
Tae inventory of the facility as calculated by the flow measurements of the
inspector at time t shall be the following:
J (t) =1 tm. dt' - Jm dt' + J (0)
~n 0 out
( 1 )
As mentioned before, mi and mare the input and output rates asn out
measured by the inspector and J (0) is the inventory at time t = 0, one can
think of a situation, where t = 0 has been the last inventory taking. We are
going to determine the time t o at which the total 4llcertainty ofJ(tO) has
reached an absolute value, say UO' for exemple 10 kg or sOJaccording to
the following eqoation for tue propagation of the respective error 0
t 2. t 2
2 = f d(o )1n dt + J deo )out dt + 02
0J (t) 0 dt 0 dt 0 ( 1a )
At tuat time a direct measurement of the inventory is being required by the
safeguard authority. The directly measured inventory shall give the result
I (t
O
). If J (0) makes use of the information coming from the last inventory
taking we have
J(O) = 1(0)
Let us recall: We made the assumption that the operator is aware of
J(t) and I (ta).
Also in the following considerations we have constantly to be aware of
this quasi partnership of operator and inspector andwe have to distinguish
sharply between statements of the operator and statements of the inspector.
- 4 -
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There will be three main classes of statements:
a) TIle probability of diversion PD (da)
This will be principally a statement of the inspector, it is his assessment
of the probability that an amount d .~ da has been diverted with a proba-
bility PD'
S) The risk of detection ~ (da' mo)
This will be principally a statement of the operator. If the operator
intends to divert a certain quantity mO he is able to calculate the risk
~ that the inspector makes a statement PD (da)'
Y) The probability of proofing Pp (~a' IDa )
Tnis will be principally a statement of the safeguard system designer.
The system designer considers the diversion of mO by the operator and
calculates the probability Pp that the inspector can make a statement
PD about the diversion of the fraction ~ of mO'
4. The Gaussian distribution
The considerations of this chapter do not refer necessarily to Gaussian
distributed errors of a measurement. But it will be of help if general
relations are more specifically spelled out in terms of the Gaussian
distribution. We therefore introduce the parameters of the Gaussian distri-
butions here.
The Gaus8ian distribution ~ (xl~) is given as followso
ep_ (xl~)u .
1= "ii'ili"::',,,n . - .a ( 2 )
$ i8 probability density
x is the value of a measurement
II is the mean value of the measurements
is the standard deviation, 2 is the variance0 0
- 5 -
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The probability, that the measurement x falls between certain limits A and
B is then given by the following expression
B
P (A ~ x ~ B) =f 4>a ( xIItl) dx '
A
lve have
+CX>J cj>a (x I IJ1) dx I = 1
-CX>





,(x l !J1) dx ' = 0,9999366 = 1- 6,3· lo-~1 (5)
11-4a
One therefore can call the range (J1 - 4a, J1 + 4a) of the lvidth 8a the
range of uncertainty U
U = 8a ( 6 )




The following figure illustrates these relations:
B







One should recall that in the theory of diffusion we have (see also (la) )
2° ..., t
5. The comparison of different inventory measurements
The measurement of the input and output rates, that is the flow, may have
resulted at time t a in a certain value for the inventory J = J (ta) according
to (1). The mechanism of equation (1) results in only one value. But for a
rigid statistical assessment we have to have at least two flow measurements,
therefore we do have to make the assumption that all flow measurements are
performed at least twice, either by repeating each flow measurement or better
by installing a second channel for flow measurement. As a matter of fact, one
should not discard the possibility that this second channel for flow measurement
could be the operators channel. This has to some extent been considered more
recently[2J. Such a procedure will result in a situation where the inspector
(and according to our assumption also the operator) is aware of a mean value
of J (ta) and the connected standard deviation 0J. We denote Ja to be that
mean value. The true value of the hold up will then be somewhere in the
intervall (Ja - 4o
J
, Ja + 4o
J
), (see (5) and (6) ). According to our assumptions
of paragraph 2.) t
a
will have been choosen by the inspector in such a way,
that at t a the absolute range of uncertainty U (ta) has passed a certain
threshold and the inspector invokes the third safeguard measure, the in-
ventory taking. This inventory taking results in an actual value Ia.
Please note: All third safeguard measurements result in I, second safeguard
measurements in J. We now distinguish between three different cases:
a) The inventory measurement is exact. This means that Ia is the true value.
b) There exists an apriori knowledge of the standard deviation 01 of t~king
the invento~y. Further, the invento~y taking shall be executed n times,
therefore tgere exists a mean value 1
0
(if n > 1) and the standard
deviation ~ for the mean value of the n measurements. The true value




c) There exists only the apriori knowledge of the standard deviation 0 1
of taking the inventory, but the inventory taking shall be executed
only once, no mean value exists therefore.
( 8 )
follows
_; (X - J O)2
• e 0 J
5a) We now consider the case a) in more detail. The result of the inspectors
flow measurement is distributed as
According to our assumptions the result of the actual inventory taking Ia
is the true value. We therefore can illustrate the situation as follows:
Fig. 3
In the general case we have to assume Ia+Jo• The difference (Ja - Ia) > 0
indicates that there might have been a diversion.
In that case of a diversion tlle missing amount is either still in the contain-
ment or may have been brought out of thecontainment by making use of the
incompleteness of the containment. The inspector now cannot conclude that the
diverted amoID1t was JO - Ia. All what he can say is the following set of
statements:
a) The true value of J is within the range (i 2 J ~ ~ ) with the following
probability:
- 8 -
P. = P (
J.,OO
i < J < 00
- 8 -
( 9 )
i = Ia + dO
Therefore a quantity d ~ dO has been diverted with a probability P.J. ,co
ß) The true value of J is within the range (la ~ J ~ i) with the following
probabili ty:
PI . = P (la ~ J ~ i)a,J. -t ~C1J (x' IJ ) dx'o ( 10 )
Therefore a qantity 0 ~ d ~ do has been diverted with a probability
PI .a,J.
y) The true value of J is within the range (-00 ~ J ~ la) with the following
probability:
Ia
P-oo la = P (-00 ~ J _~ Ia) = f· ~C1 (x' IJ ) dx' ( 11 ), -00 J 0
Therefore a quantity d?-, 0 has been added (!) with a probability
P-00, la
The statement a) can be used to assess the probability of diversion of
an amount ~ do. It should be realized however that such an assessment only
makes sense in the context of the statements ß) and y) , in particular y).
This can best be demonstrated, if la =J
O
• In that case an amount ~ dO
has been diverted with the probability Pd ,but it is also true that the
0,00
same amount _?: da has been added with the same probability (!)
With this reservation we define
dx' ( 12 )
for the statement, that an amount d ~ dO has been diverted with the pro-
bability PD(da).
ßecause of the above mentioned reservation PD as such is only then intuitivly
indicative for diversion, if the probability for having added something is
sufficiently small, or in other words, if PD is sufficiently large, say above




accompanied by statements ß) and y).
Sb) We now take into account the more realistic case b)
The inspector has in thatcase besides of (8) the distribution for the inventory
taking. For the measurement 1 we get:
1 rn . e - t (~r-7*)2
~ (rlro) =~ •0I/IU Y L;'lf 0 1




The true value of the inventory as taken from the third safeguard measure is




(x' IJ ) dx'o ( 14 )
I may vary from -~ to +~ und we have to make the following integration in
order to arrive at PD (da):
~ ./ r-... (1 I1 0 ) d1 •01 va ( 15 )
This is a double integral and we will be able to execute one of these two








x =7! (~ + n) + da
1
I = 7! (n - ~)
and the Jaeobian
or
o (x, I) =
o (~, n)
1
n =7't (I + (x - da) )
we obtain from (15) the following expression:
The first integration along the n axis ean be performed and we obtain the
following
r dZ' ( 17 )
where ( 18 )
If one takes (8) and (12) one realizes, that (18) 1s of the same nature as
(12) • 10 is the mean value and the standard deviation has been enlarged,
a T has been replaeed byll a~ ? One ean arrive inunediately at (17) with
W f ; + a~
the following reasoning: In ease of no diversion the mean value ro of n
inventory takings is expeeted to be distributed with the distribution
4> 0 (x IJa), that means , that
J
4>ges ( 19 )
- 11 -
- 11 -
is the distribution, against which the actually measured mean value of n
inventory measurements has to be balanced in the same sense as in case
a) that is (12), if a statement on possible diversion is to be obtained.
According to the theorem of propagation of errors we have
( 20 )
This situation is illustrated in the next figure
2 2
oges= 0 J + 0 I /(i1
Fig. 6
x
TIle situation of Fig. 4 and Fig. 6 1s identical according to the equality
of (15) and (17).
5c) Now it is easy to deal with case c). Here again 0 1 is kno\~ apriori
according to our assumption,but only one inventory taking is executed.
TIlerefore we apply (17) with n = I and 10 = In, if Ia is that one actually




Diagram I shows equation (17) for the following € values
€ = 0, € = 1, € = 2
- 12-
- 12 -
The plot has been normalized as follows
(in the diagram's notation Uo = 80J )
and Ct =
7. The risk of diversion p~
The risk of diversion is a statement of an operator who is contemplating
about thc question whether he ean risk a diversion or not. This operator
has one more information than the inspeetor, namely he knows the amount
roo whieh he intends to divert. In the following eonsiderations we make the
assumption, that this quantity m
O
is known exaetly, in ease it is known only
with ,a certain aeeuraey, all relevant standard deviations 02 have to be
222
enlarged aeeording to 0tot = 0 + oma
Let us reeall that the operator is aware of the flow measurements of the
inspeetor at the-time of his eontemplation about the diversion of mO' he
therefore knows ~o (xija). This distribution is the basis for expeeting
the results of theJinventory measureroents I immediately before the inventory
taking. 1f the operator diverts m
O
he has to eonsider a different distribution,
namely ~OJ (xlJo - roo) as the basis for his expeetation of the 1's. Let us
assume for the moment, that the inventory taking will be exaet, that 0
1
= 0,
an aetual inventory taking gives therefore the exaet value of inventory.
TIlis situation is illustrated in the following figure:
r------ d -----;.... .,1
~-- do----.-I







Now the operator argues about tbe situation of this actual inventory taking.
With the probability
( 22 )
this actual inventory taking is within the range (-00, J 1), say at Ia. In that
case the operator has to expect a statement PD from the inspector as foliows:
IUth the probability
+00
f <P (x' IJa) dx'Ia+d °J ( 23 )
an amount of material> d has been diverted. With the probability P-oo J, 1
the value of d in (23) is ~ da and P-=, J is the risk that Ia.~ Jto We
therefore define P-oo J to be the risk p~ (da' ma)·, 1
~~e operator associates the risk
( 24 )
to a statement of the inspector that with the probability PD
( 25 )
an amount of material ~ d, where d ~ do' has been diverted. Before we inter-
prete (24) and (25) further, we will introduce the case of inaccurate inven-
tory taking. In that case the probability of having an actual inventory
taking within the range (-00, J
1
) is
P-OQ , J = P(-OQ ~ I ~ J t )i ~
( 22a )
instead of (22), because the standard deviation 01 is broadering the former
distribution<p (x' IJa - ma), the inventory taking contains its own error.0J
Now the operator expects a statement of the inspector after having taken the
inventory. The inspector is not aware of the former considerations of the
operator and makes a straight forward statement taking into account 0J and




(x' IJ ) dx'o ( 23a )
We therefore have instead of (24) and (25) the following
(x' IJ - m ) dx'o 0 ( 24a )
and ( 25a )
As a matter of fact, if parallel to ourprevious considerations the inventory
(j
taking takes p1aces n times, only ,;,; is to be taken into account for the,n
mean value of that inventory taking. We now discuss (24a) andaSa). The
mathematical form of p~ (do) is simple but the important thing is to rea1ize
the interconnections of the parameters of (24a) and (25a). In order to do
this/we make clear that the operator starts the 1ine of arguments with a
reflection on the value of PD which he is ready to face. Therefore this
va1ue PD is known-to him, say 0,85 for instance. By that the operator
arrives at J 2. Now the operator continues to reflect on the lower limit
of the dIs, which he is ready to face, tllat is do. By that he obtains
J
1
= J 2 - do' the upper limit of (24a). Tais approach for defining Ru
becomes fu11y obvious, if there is an established threshold of alarm,
say PD = (PD)AL and dO = (do)AL. In that case the operator will probably
cOIlsider these values for PD and dO as a starting point for his assessment of
the risk ~(do' mo). The diagrams 2 and 3 have been plotted for this letter
case. Tbe following thresholds of alarm have been considered. In case of
diagram 2 we have
(dO) AL ~ 0,1 UJ
(PD)AL = 0,7; 0,90; 0,99
In case of diagram 3 we have
(dO)AL ~ 0,2 UJ
(PD)AL = 0,7; 0,90; 0,99
- 15 -
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The other parameters are as follows
1..1 therefore is the normalized amount of materialwhich the operator intends
to divert.
8. The probability of proofing Pp
We recall that this probability of proofing Pp is a statement of the safeguard
system designer •.
We assume for the moment that the inventory taking is accurate, an actual
inventory taking Ia gives the true inventory.
Thc inspector of the s~feguard system which the designer is considering,is
aware of the distribution ~a (xIJo) of the flow measurements. Now the system
designer assumes that the op~rator diverts the quantity mO• In the sequence of
the arguments of the designer he only can expect that an actual inventory
taking will take place, it does however not take place yet in reality. The
designer therefore can only attribute a certain probability for obtaining
a certain result of inventory taking. This leads the designer to the distri-
bution ~cr (xlJo - ma ) for the prediction of the actual value
Ia of inventoryJtaking. The fact, that this inventory does not take place,
is one of the differences bebleen the statement of the inspector PD and that
of the system designer Pp' In the system designer's line of argument,an
inspector has the chance to detect an amount d ~ da with a value of PD > a
whatever it may oe:











dp ( 27 )
( 28 )d~'[
1';1 - 1]2 2rr (j omoJ
expression
mo is a known quantity for the system designer. The proofing probability asks
for the probability that a fraction ~ ~ of mO can be detected. We therefore
introduce the quantity ~I =~ in the integral and arrive at the following
roo
111is is already the proofing probability Pp (1';0' m
O
) in case of an exact inventory
taking. According to Sc) the procedure in case of an inaccurate inventory taking
is exactly parallel to (15), all what has to be changed is the standard deviation.











L1e designer now makes the statement, that his safeguard system is capable
to detect a fraction 1'; ~ 1';0 of a diversion mO with the probability Pp.
Note: the larger m
O
is the smaller is the standard deviation (jtot of thc
distribution ep (~I 11). In diagram 4 equation (29) is evaluated. In(j
. -. . tot. .t.us dJ.agram tue abzJ.ssa J.S




Tne considerations of part 11 of this paper shall help to prepare a more rigid
system analysis. ~~ey shall help to focus the attention to the fact that all
safeguard systems are necessarily not ideal and that there is room for making
quantitative statements. In distinguishing between the statements of the
inspector, the operator and the system designer one can see that the evaluation
of safeguard systems is not a straight forward thing.
Literature (Part 11)
l-I~7 Baeekmann, A.v.; Gmelin, W.; Gupta, D.;
Häfele, VI.
Fissile Material Flow Control
at Strategie Points in a
Reproeessing Plant
KFK 801 (I 968)
Use of Statistieal Analysis
for the Establishment of
Material Balance in a
Reproeessing Plant















(Jo-ra ) The difference between the mean value s of th roughput and---




The ratio of standard deviations of throughput (O'J) and
inventory (0'1) measurements
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where : Pal = The probability I Po ) AL
,.... = ~
Uo
mo = The amount the operator schedul!!s to divert
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